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Abstract 
After the financial crash of 2008 the intellectual thought of the Austrian-Hungarian scholar Karl Polanyi 
(1889-1964) has seen a resurgence in academic research to explain the origins of the crisis. His notions of 
the (dis)embeddedness of markets and the double movement have proven to be useful concepts in the 
analysis of the origins and effects of the financial crash of 2008. However, currently there is an intellectual 
debate going on between so called hard- and soft-Polanyian scholars on the understanding of the notion of 
(re)embedding the market. Soft-Polanyians believe in the possibility of embeddedness and see in this 
Polanyian idea a call for the social-democratic ideal. Hard-Polanyians on the other hand do not understand 
Polanyian thought in this way and argue that Polanyi has never believed in the possibility of (re)embedding 
the market, since attempts to do so can only backfire societally. In addition, Polanyi’s moral and ethical 
approach in the conceptualization of the economy will be addressed, with special attention to the notions 
of market dependency and human livelihood. The different perspectives present in this discussion are used 
to make an assessment of the potential(s) of the imposition of the financial transaction tax as it is currently 
underway in the legislative process of the European Union. 
 
Keywords: Karl Polanyi / financial transaction tax (FTT) / European Union / market (re)embeddedness / 
double movement / (de)commodification / regulation / capitalism / Tobin / Global Financial Crash of 2008 
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Introduction 
Since the global financial crisis (GFC) that started in 2008 there has been an ongoing political debate on 
the possibilities of regulating the capitalist market economy. In many areas it is limited to discussion only, 
but in some it has led to real policy development and implementation. For example, much has been done 
in the realm of banking regulation. In the U.S. the Obama Administration introduced the Dodd-Frank Act 
(which saw itself repealed by the Trump Administration) and through the Basel IV agreement new global 
standards of bank’s capital reserve requirements have been set. Also the idea of imposing a tax on financial 
transactions (FTT/Tobin tax) was contemplated by world leaders for a considerable time. Nonetheless, 
many of the discussions and ideas have found themselves in the bin, knowing to be too bold and 
provocative facing the whims and forces of global capitalism.  
It is no surprise that in this same period the academic world has witnessed a resurgence of interest 
in the thoughts and ideas of the Austrian-Hungarian political economist, economic historian and historical 
sociologist Karl Polanyi (1889-1964). The theories laid out in his magnum opus The Great Transformation 
(henceforth: TGT), first published in 1944, provide a comprehensive framework for a critique of the 
concept of the market economy in general and are especially useful to analyze the deeper origins of the 
crisis, a crisis often referred to as a crisis of capitalism itself. Especially now, in the post-GFC era, 
conceptual thinking on the (im)possibilities of regulating capitalism is essential. The times humankind 
currently lives through give rise to a kind of momentum that capitalist history provides only once in a 
while. The crises of the public sector after years of austerity,1 the imminent threat of climate change and 
the dreadful effects of the global corona virus pandemic show the limits and downsides of the current 
global capitalist system. Together with a rising popularity of new political movements (Polanyian counter-
movements) all across the spectrum with differing ideas regarding the current system, it is useful to assess 
former and novel political agenda’s through a Polanyian lens. It represents nothing less than a judgment 
on the proposals’ potential success of being a project that ‘re-embeds’ the market economy.   
This leads directly to the most important notion in Polanyi’s work: the idea of embeddedness. 
Meant specifically by this is the degree to which economic activity is constrained by non-economic 
institutions. In this regard, the functioning of the economy cannot be perceived without taking into account 
the larger institutional and social structures in which it takes place. Capitalism, in a Polanyian 
understanding, has been a watershed moment: until the start of the capitalist system the market has been 
embedded in social relations. In other words: in pre-capitalist times, the market was made useful for 
society, but was not dominating it. With the introduction of the capitalist system, the market became 
 
1 Joseph Stiglitz, Todd Tucker and Gabriel Zucman, ‘The Starving State: Why Capitalism’s Salvation Depends on 
Taxation,’ Foreign Affairs January/February (2020).  
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disembedded. To some scholars the practical application of the notion of embeddedness could be found in 
the concept of embedded liberalism coined as such by the IR scholar John Ruggie in 1982. According to 
Ruggie embedded liberalism defined the post-war period (1945-1973) during which the Bretton Woods 
system became the framework of international economic governance.2 It was a system that promoted and 
enabled free trade while at the same time giving states the discretionary power and freedom to implement 
welfare policies and programs. This included the ability to impose capital controls. Ruggie partly built his 
theory on the notion of (dis)embeddedness by Polanyi.  
According to the conventional understanding, Polanyi was already looking ahead to the 
(re)construction of the post-war international order during the writing of the TGT, arguing that designing 
a system in which the market economy would be reembedded in society should be an essential task for the 
international community. Therefore, certain Polanyian scholars are convinced the system of embedded 
liberalism is to a reasonable extent what Polanyi himself envisaged. The period of embedded liberalism 
also gets referred to as the golden age of social democracy with significant degrees of socio-economic 
equality, high economic growth rates and thriving social welfare states. The failure to maintain this 
international system during the age of stagflation after the oil crisis of 1973 and the subsequent neoliberal 
turn, entering into a period of increasing disembeddedness, is what ultimately resulted in the GFC of 2008.  
As has been mentioned, in the conventional Polanyian understanding Polanyi’s writings have 
pointed in the direction of embedded liberalism. Simply reimplementing a similar system in contemporary 
times could safeguard society from the havoc it experienced with the GFC. This conventional 
understanding of Polanyi is mostly shaped by the work of Fred Block and Margaret Somers. It is 
conventional in the sense that it is the most commonly used Polanyian perspective. Block and Somers 
perceive the theory of (re)embeddedness to be a call for the social-democratic ideal. However, this 
perspective is being heavily scrutinized by Hannes Lacher, who is considered to be a hard-Polanyian, 
subsequently rendering Block and Somers soft-Polanyian. Lacher is critical of the vision of Block and 
Somer’s, because he believes it does not accurately reflect Polanyi’s attitude towards capitalism. According 
to Lacher, Polanyi was much more radical in his belief that capitalism ultimately was not to be regulated. 
Embedded liberalism in this regard was not an instance of embeddedness of capitalism in society, it was 
rather the other way around. Society was embedded in the capitalist system.  
The system of Bretton Woods was rooted in the tradition of FDR’s New Deal that originated in 
the 1930s. New Deal politics was made possible through the achievements in productivity levels of 
Fordism. Through the promise of perpetual productivity growth and a relatively benevolent welfare state 
a capital-labour agreement was reached. However, what this resulted in was a situation for labour in which 
 
2 John Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic 
Order,’ International Organization 36:2 (1982), p.385-388.  
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it lost its incentives for political action, since many of its demands were already met. This system has been 
internationally universalized in the post-war era by means of the system of Bretton Woods, something 
which Polanyi, according to Lacher, perceived not as a form of embeddedness, but rather as the 
universalization of capitalism, because this system ultimately still places and consolidates the market 
economy at the core of the order. This post-war welfare capitalism did not fit in Polanyi’s vision of 
embeddedness that more amounts to a kind of democratic socialism ‘in which money, land and labour 
would have lost their character as ‘factors of production.’3 Important in this regard is that according to 
Polanyi regulated capitalism is an utopia, because it goes against the inherent logics of the market. All 
protective measures against the perils of the market ultimately lead to economic disaster. One could argue 
this is what the world has witnessed with the collapse of Bretton Woods in 1973 and the subsequent 
neoliberal turn.  
This discussion specifically resonates in the light of the ongoing discussion on the imposition of a 
taxation on financial transactions (henceforth: FTT), otherwise known as the Tobin tax. The idea has been 
already introduced by Keynes in the 1920s and was popularized by the American economist and Nobel 
prize laureate James Tobin in 1972. ‘It is a tax on spot currency conversions that was originally proposed 
with the intention of penalizing short-term currency speculation… the Tobin tax was meant to apply to 
financial sector participants as a means of controlling the stability of a given country's currency.’4 Or as 
Tobin himself described the purpose of the tax: to throw ‘some sand in the wheels of inter-national 
finance.’5 After the GFC the FTT posed an attractive solution to the question of how to finance the costs of 
the crisis. As has become clear by now it has been mostly tax payers that have been picking up the tab, but 
there clearly have been ideas laying around at the negotiation table(s) that were aimed at making 
international finance to chip in. For a moment this discussion was at the very center of global politics, 
becoming the main agenda point at the G20 of 2011 and gaining the vocal support of many industrialized 
economies. In the end no agreement was reached, due to the many complications and challenges the FTT 
poses.6 Currently, the European Union (EU) is still in the process of legislating a FTT, something that was 
planned to be finished in 2014, but became caught up in political complications and delay.7  
 
3 Hannes Lacher, ‘Embedded Liberalism, Disembedded Markets: Reconceptualising the Pax Americana,’ New 
Political Economy 4:3 (1999), p.344-345. 
4 Investopedia, ‘Tobin tax,’ accessed on 12 December, 2019, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/tobin-tax.asp. 
5 James Tobin, ‘Eliot Janeway Lectures on Historical Economics 1559: The New Economics One Decade Older,’ 
(Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1974), p.88. 
6 Reuters, ‘G20 fails to endorse financial transaction tax,’ accessed on July 2, 2020, 
https://www.reuters.com/article/g20-tax/g20-fails-to-endorse-financial-transaction-tax-idUSN1E7A302520111104. 
7 European Parliament, ‘Legislative train schedule: financial transaction tax,’ accessed on July 2, 2020, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-deeper-and-fairer-internal-market-with-a-strengthened-
industrial-base-taxation/file-financial-transaction-tax. 
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In the context of the EU’s re-regulation project the FTT is very much envisaged as an essential 
part of it. It is for that reason that the FTT will be the central case of discussion in this thesis project. Due 
to its diverse group of advocates and fanatic opponents and the wide range of different arguments used in 
the discussion and the very fact that it remains to be seen as a legitimate regulatory option, it makes for a 
promising case to bring into a Polanyian framework. With this in mind, the thesis will develop as follows: 
first there will be a further exposition of Polanyi’s key concepts regarding the market society: 
commodification, (dis)embeddedness and the double movement outlined in the conventional understanding 
of Polanyian thought. Followed up by an examination of the strong (i.e. hard-Polanyian) critique on the 
former and concluded with an attempt to establish an outlook for how Polanyi’s notions can be used 
meaningfully in contemporary times. In the second part of this thesis the latter will be attempted regarding 
the case of the FTT, starting with finding out to what extent theorizing the FTT as introduced by James 
Tobin intersects with some of the notions present in Polanyian scholarship, followed by an assessment of 
evidence on existing cases of an imposed FTT, such as in France. The second part will be concluded with 
a paragraph exploring how the Polanyian framework can be used in understanding the deeper meaning of 
the contemporary debate on the imposition of the FTT in the European Union.  
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PART ONE 
Why Polanyian Thought Remains to be Compelling: 
an Overview of Polanyian Scholarship and Distinctive Understandings 
 
1.1 | The Comeback Kid: Polanyi’s Resonance 
Looking at the subject(s) of Polanyi’s most significant notions, it should be frankly no surprise that after 
the GFC Polanyi has regained a spot at the forefront of political-economic scholarship. His intellectual 
work addresses the major components of the contemporary political-economy that are perceived to be at 
the root of the crisis. At the core of Polanyi’s work is the fundamental critique of the market economy and 
the Polanyian notions of embeddedness, commodification and the double movement are closely tied to it. 
In this chapter these key notions and their distinctive understandings will be lined out. As has been touched 
upon in the introduction, in order to understand Polanyi, the ‘stark utopian’ idea of the market economy has 
to be at the centre of consideration. The market economy is characterized by the practice of putting all 
aspects of life under the rule of the market, i.e. the law(s) of supply and demand and Adam Smith’s 
(in)famous invisible hand. In other words, the so called self-regulating market turns all social relations into 
market relations. As Polanyi puts it in the TGT:  
 
‘A market economy is an economic system controlled, regulated, and directed by market 
prices; order in the production and distribution of goods is entrusted to this self-regulating 
mechanism. An economy of this kind derives from the expectation that human beings 
behave in such a way as to achieve maximum money gains. It assumes markets in which 
the supply of goods ( including services) available at a definite price will equal the demand 
at that price. It assumes the presence of money, which functions as purchasing power in 
the hands of its owners. Production will then be controlled by prices, for the profits of those 
who direct production will depend upon them; the distribution of the goods also will 
depend upon prices, for prices form incomes, and it is with the help of these incomes that 
the goods produced are distributed amongst the members of society. Under these 
assumptions order in the production and distribution of goods is ensured by prices alone.’8 
 
Key in this is not the lack of direct government interference into the practices of the market, but rather the 
political imposition and expansion of market structures in society. This is also where Polanyi’s famous 
 
8 Karl Polanyi, ‘The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time,’ (London: Beacon 
Press, 2001), p.71-72.  
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insight of ‘laissez-faire is planned’ comes in.9 Something which contemporary scholarship on neoliberal 
capitalism, with market fundamentalism as most prominent feature, reiterates in the acknowledgement of 
the pivotal role of governments in the processes of marketization (and financialization).10  
An important aspect in the development of the market society is the idea of commodification. 
Polanyi was in this sense mostly concerned with the fact that in a market society the tendency exists to 
make every part of social and natural life ‘tradable’ as a commodity. A true capitalist and self-regulating 
market society is according to Polanyi defined by the creation of so-called ‘fictitious commodities.’ The 
three he specifically points out are the commodification of land, labor and money. This dynamic is also 
what in the Polanyian perspective defines capitalism. The processes of creating the market society and the 
commodification of land, labor and money are unique in history and should not be perceived as being 
transhistorical. With the introduction of the self-regulating market the notion of disembeddedness becomes 
visible. This idea should be perceived as one of the cornerstones of Polanyi’s scholarship. Embeddedness 
‘expresses the idea that the economy is not autonomous, as it must be in economic theory, but subordinated 
to politics, religion, and social relations.’11 It is with the establishment of the market economy, as earlier 
defined, that it starts to get disembedded from society, something that was unprecedented in human history 
before the First Industrial Revolution took place. After that, through the nineteenth century a process of 
finding a stable configuration of international relations took place and was found by basing it on four pillars, 
all in support of economic liberalism and the (laissez-faire) market economy. The following four principles 
determined this specific period of civilization: the balance of power system, the international gold standard, 
the self-regulating market and the liberal state. It was in this environment that haute finance could flourish 
as the link between the political and the economic. The international economic system became the axis of 
material existence for humankind.  Clearly, for this system to work it needed peace. When the gold standard 
started to crumble, the system could not longer be maintained and total disintegration followed.12  
What is essential in this respect is Polanyi’s argument that the system broke down because it was 
based on the utopian idea of a self-regulating market. The Great Power’s desperate attempts (with social 
unrest in almost all countries in Europe) to maintain the system of economic liberalism and the market 
economy in the chaotic period around and after the First World War followed by the financial crash of 1928 
ultimately gave rise to a omnipresent societal backlash that took the form of fascist and communist protests 
arguing for the reinstallment of a government-planned economy. Polanyi dubbed this societal backlash the 
rise of the countermovement. It constituted a response to the elitist movement(s) imposition of the self-
 
9 Polanyi, The Great Transformation, p.147. 
10 Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press).  
11 Polanyi, The Great Transformation, p.21-22.  
12 Ibid., p.3-20. 
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regulating market including all its havocking forces. This ‘battle’ of the promotion of the self-regulating 
market on the one hand and the following backlash by the forces of society on the other is what Polanyi 
called the dynamic of the double movement. A dynamic that is a reoccurring theme in the development of 
capitalism.  
 Where in Europe the rise of fascism and communism led to the havoc of the Second World War, it 
resulted in a different event across the Atlantic. In the United States after the election of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt in 1933 the rising tide of socialism was halted by reaching a labor-capital agreement made 
possible by Fordism’s highly increased productivity rates.13 This became to be known as the New Deal 
which was developed nationally in times of American isolationism and was characterized by political 
stability and economic prosperity through a somewhat redistributive system of a relatively generous welfare 
state and high progressive tax rates. After the Second World War the New Deal was internationalized 
through the system of Bretton Woods with the U.S. in a driving role to bring (especially European countries) 
into the system. This new international order enabled countries to hold discretionary powers over domestic 
welfare state policies, while simultaneously adhering to the international financial and monetary system 
based on the dollar as reserve currency backed by gold. Maintaining strong union membership and the right 
of free collective bargaining, an expanding welfare state together with a guarantee of full employment and 
yearly wage increases, showed a good position for the working classes.14 For many scholars studying 
Polanyi the Bretton Woods system must have been what Polanyi envisaged with the idea of embeddedness. 
The famous IR-scholar John Ruggie dubbed the period (1945-1973) therefor ‘embedded liberalism’ 
building on Polanyi’s theory and others calling it the golden age of capitalism and social-democracy.15 Over 
time this has become the conventional reading of embeddedness.  This has become a major point of debate, 
since there have been different understandings of the meaning of embeddedness. Dominant Polanyian 
scholarship, which are later to be grouped the soft-Polanyians, has understood Polanyi to be positive about 
the events of the New Deal and the post-war period Bretton Woods, since according to them Polanyi 
perceived those to be so-called counter movements to fight against the laissez-faire liberal order. Polanyi’s 
apparent paradoxical attitude towards the regulation of capitalism has ultimately resulted in the two distinct 
readings of his work.  
The historical events regarding the New Deal and the period of ‘embedded liberalism’ seem to have 
shaped the conventional understanding of Polanyi which has mostly been articulated by Fred Block and 
Margaret Somers. Block and Somers base the conclusion - that Polanyi would have perceived the realities 
 
13 Charles S. Maier, ‘The politics of productivity: foundations of American international economic policy after 
World War II,’ International Organization 31:4 (1977), p.630-633. 
14 Wolfgang Streeck, ‘How Will Capitalism End?’ The New Left Review 57 (2014), p.50-55. 
15 Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic 
Order,’ (1982), p.385-388. 
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of the New Deal and Bretton Woods as ‘embeddedness’ - on the observation that his work is ultimately 
incoherent and paradoxical. According to them it is impossible to make the claim that Polanyi would have 
been against a system of regulation through social-democracy. Based on research of his personal archive 
Block and Somers argue that due to trivial matters, such as strict deadlines causing time constraints, Polanyi 
has not been able to clearly lay out what he would have perceived as embeddedness in the practical sense. 
According to correspondence between Polanyi and his wife, by early publication of the TGT he hoped to 
make an impact on the post-war debate of reconstruction and systemic reform.16 
A fundamental aspect of Block and Somer’s interpretation of Polanyi’s notion of embeddedness is 
the idea that the market is always embedded in social relations, but differing in its extent and specific 
conditions. For example, according to Block and Somers the period of de-regulation of the financial sector 
under the post-Bretton Woods neoliberal regime is not a case of disembedding markets, but rather a re-
regulation of the financial sector and in their understanding subsequently a re-embedding of the market. In 
this case, the state chose a different set of rules in order to benefit a specific class of interests, so the market 
was simply embedded in a ‘different’ direction. In this regard, it seems that for soft-Polanyians, Polanyi 
was concerned with the degree of embeddedness. Block and Somers point at the important aspect of 
commodification of land, labor and money. They use a broader description of this notion: ‘education, health 
care, a sustainable environment, personal and social security, and the right to earn a livelihood. It is when 
these public goods are turned into commodities and subjected to market principles that social life is 
threatened fundamentally and major crises ensue. According to Polanyi, these necessities of social life have 
to be protected from the market by social and political institutions and recognized as rights rather than 
commodities, or human freedom will be endangered.’17 In the view put forward by Block and Somers the 
situation described by Polanyi has been best addressed in the Bretton Woods period. Ensuring these rights 
is a matter of (re)regulation, just as much as neoliberal states have chosen to let economic rights prevail 
over social rights.18  
Even though, Block and Somers’ theorization of embeddedness sheds an original light on the term, 
in this regard, the notion of embeddedness gets trivialized and it is on the meaning of the term most debate 
on Polanyi’s work has been sparked. When Block and Somers advocate the fundamental issues that have 
arisen through capitalism (ergo the commodification of social rights)  could be simply neutralized by a form 
of (re)regulation, the question arises whether they have seriously considered every aspect of Polanyi’s 
theory. Block and Somers have a strong focus on the ever present role of state and government in the 
 
16 Fred Block and Margaret Somers, ‘The Power of Market Fundamentalism: Karl Polanyi’s Critique,’ (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), p.82.  
17 Ibid., p.9. 
18 Ray Kiely, 'From authoritarian liberalism to economic technocracy: Neoliberalism, politics 
and “de-democratization”,' Critical Sociology 43, 2017, p.725-745. 
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coordination of social and economic life, but one could argue this results in a neglect of the essential role 
the notion of commodification plays in the dynamic of market disembeddedness. 
 
1.2 | Embeddedness Contested:  Hard-Polanyian Critique on the Conventional Reading of Polanyi 
With the resurgence of academic attention for the work of Polanyi came the debate on how to understand 
the Polanyian theories and concepts. As has been pointed out in the previous sub-chapter, the soft-Polanyian 
understanding is prone for scrutiny. Currently the reading of Block and Somers is highly contested by an 
alternative stream of Polanyian thought, called hard-Polanyianism. Most prominent hard-Polanyian scholar 
is Hannes Lacher, but also a theorist like Timothy David Clark fits in this contesting perspective. Polanyi’s 
biographer Gareth Dale is not necessarily considered to be hard-Polanyian, but is in his work sympathetic 
to the use of a hard-Polanyian perspective as an legitimate opposition to the conventional reading, 
positioning himself somewhat neutral in the discussion. This perspective contests the conclusion drawn by 
Block and Somers. Hard-Polanyians argue soft-Polanyians are wrong when stating Polanyi’s work is 
paradoxical due to its theoretical shift towards a more social-democratic ideal. According to them this 
perspective alters the entire essence of what Polanyi tried to say.19 Lacher has written extensively on the 
concept of ‘embeddedness’, especially as applied to the context of embedded liberalism in the post-war 
period. To soft-Polanyians Bretton Woods is considered to be a period during which the power of 
international capital and its mobility were severely restricted. In this regard, Eric Helleiner has called 
Bretton Woods a ‘socially embedded international financial order.’20 In his introduction to the last edition 
of TGT in 2001 Joseph Stiglitz argued along the same lines.21 However, Lacher points out that this situation 
cannot be equaled to Polanyi’s vision of embedding the economy. For Polanyi this would mean the removal 
of the market as the dominating institution in society. Since this was not the case, it is appropriate to call 
the post-war period rather one of liberal democratic or welfare capitalism. As Lacher articulates creatively: 
‘Keynes saved capitalism and Roosevelt armed it’.22 It makes clear the idea that the period of Bretton 
Woods does not entail any form of embeddedness, but rather the universalization of capitalism.  
 Key in this debate is how one should understand the idea of embeddedness regarding its relationship 
with the existence and functioning of the market. Recalling that Polanyi called the self-regulating / laissez-
faire market economy a ‘stark utopia’, its consequence should be that it cannot last, since its forces are so 
 
19 Hannes Lacher, ‘Karl Polanyi, the “always-embedded market economy,” and the re-writing of The Great 
Transformation,’ Theory and Society 48 (2019), p.676. 
20 Eric Helleiner, ‘Globalization and Haute Finance,’ in ‘Karl Polanyi in Vienna: The Contemporary Significance of 
the Great Transformation,’ ed. Kari Polanyi-Levitt and Kenneth McRobble, (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2005), 
p.15.  
21 Joseph Stiglitz, ‘Preface to Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation,’ (London: Beacon Press, 2001), p.vii-xvi. 
22 Lacher, Embedded Liberalism, Disembedded Markets: Reconceptualising the Pax Americana, p.344.  
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destructive it annihilates all of its surroundings. The ongoing crises of global warming and climate change 
are a clear manifestation of it. However, that the self-regulating market economy might be prone to crises 
and not be sustainable in the longer run does not necessarily mean it cannot thrive for a significant time.  
The market economy breeds the rise of the market mechanism, which constitutes a degree of self-
regulation by subordinating human relations to its logic. It is this market mechanism that needs to be 
dominant in a laissez-faire economic system (i.e. market economy), in order to make it work. Only then 
there is place for some form of alternative ‘modes of allocation’ (i.e. value distribution) like social 
redistribution (through government intervention) or reciprocity (which is the practice of exchanging 
something for mutual benefit, e.g. reciprocity in the abolition of tariff rates between trading countries.) 
Dominance of the market mechanism requires almost total dependency of practically all segments of society 
on the functioning of the market. When this is the case, interference with this logic (which is prevalent 
across the whole of society by then) threatens the very livelihood of all members of society. Lacher explains: 
‘As long as land and labour were still being bought and sold in the market, protective measures would and 
could not ‘re-embed’ the market; they would merely ‘impair’ it, Polanyi asserted […] In the end, people 
would still have to sell their labour in the market in order to make a living. They would still depend for 
their livelihood on the willingness of the owners of industry to deploy their capital and to employ them. But 
with distorted prices and impaired markets, that could no longer be presumed, Polanyi argued.’23 This is 
what Polanyi meant with the so-called inevitable societal backlash. With or without interference, the market 
economy is in its essence an all destructing system. As Lacher puts it: ‘it will endanger the livelihood of 
the members of society itself, as the whole material reproduction of society, its productive relationship with 
nature, has come to be mediated by the market.’24  
Ultimately, the main take away from this understanding of Polanyi’s work is that the notion of 
regulated capitalism is just as utopian as the idea of self-regulating capitalism. From a Polanyian perspective 
Bretton Woods and embedded liberalism had value in providing at least a degree of protection from the 
market mechanism. However, it was limited to ‘protectionism’, as embeddedness in a strict Polanyian sense 
is far more radical in its attack on the market mechanism. Protectionism was the policy approach that in the 
post-war political economy enabled nation states to shield some segments of their society from the forces 
of international capitalism. In light of the belief in a possible continuation of a liberal capitalist growth 
model, the system of Bretton Woods provided the necessary ideological, political and economic stability. 
As has been put forward before, this was mostly constituted by shifting as many partnering nations into the 
 
23 Hannes Lacher, ‘Multilinear Trajectories: Polanyi, The Great Transformation, and the American Exception,’ in 
Karl Polanyi and 21st Century Capitalism, ed. Radhika Desai and Kari Polanyi-Levitt, (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2020), p.3. 
24 Lacher, Embedded Liberalism, Disembedded Markets: Reconceptualising the Pax Americana, p.346. 
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market-based system as possible. Therefore, the subsequent neoliberal turn is in much scholarship 
unrightfully characterized as a break with the past. It presupposes a strong demarcation between capitalism 
under ‘embedded liberalism’ and neoliberalism, while in fact the continuum of the market mechanism 
remains in place as the centre of social and societal relations.25 Here the link between commodification and 
disembeddedness as pivotal aspects of the ontology of capitalism becomes visible.  
As Clark points out: ‘the commodification of labour and land inverted the relationship between 
economy and community in an unprecedented manner, and the rise of self-gain and the market as the 
dominant principle and pattern of integration stripped human beings of their ethical environment via the 
destruction of the social and ecological bonds of human communities.’26  It ties in with the realization that 
Polanyi was first and foremost a moral economist. Concerned about the morality and ethics of social 
relations, Polanyi saw capitalism had an alienating effect on human behavior: ‘the ascension of self-gain 
and the market society not only initiated the destruction of the moral foundations of the community, it 
simultaneously impeded the ability of individuals to perceive the ethical ramifications of their actions and 
thus to behave ethically.’27 It is important to take into account Polanyi’s approach as fundamentally moral, 
since it is in this regard Polanyi tried to differentiate his theory from dominant streams of thought like 
neoclassical economics but also scientific socialism. Both were in Polanyi’s eyes overly concerned with 
the material at the expense of the ethical dimension, which ultimately defines humanity. In this regard, 
since according to Polanyi the inherent capitalist principles of self-gain and the market mechanism threaten 
the very moral and ethical basis of humankind, it becomes impossible to see in what sense a soft-Polanyian 
perspective can endure. (Re)regulation as put forward by Block and Somers would only allow and 
legitimize the continuation of these capitalist principles. 
 
1.3 | What About Now? Polanyian Theory’s Potential in Contemporary Times 
In this last paragraph an outlook will be provided of how the debate on the understanding of Polanyi’s key 
notions, most primarily embeddedness, can evolve and be translated to contemporary times. What does 
Polanyi’s thought mean in current times and in what way does it constitute value when applied on specific 
cases? For this we need to delve deeper in the variety of Polanyian scholarship at hand. A less dichotomical 
Polanyian stream of thought worth mentioning, is materialized by the work done by Polanyi’s biographer 
Gareth Dale in three different books: 1. Karl Polanyi: The Limits of the Market (an intellectual biography, 
2010), Karl Polanyi: a Life on the Left (a personal biography, 2017) and Reconstructing Karl Polanyi: 
 
25 Ellen Meiksins Wood, ‘Modernity, Postmodernity or Capitalism?’ Monthly Review 48:3 (1996), p.34-38.  
26 Timothy David Clark, ‘Reclaiming Karl Polanyi, Socialist Intellectual,’ Studies in Political Economy 94 (2014), 
p.64-65. 
27 Ibid., p.65.  
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Excavation and Critique (a historical-sociological analysis, 2016). Dale is on the same page of Lacher if it 
comes to the alleged incorrectness of Block and Somer’s analysis that Polanyi provides a sort of social-
democratic political framework, or as he himself points out in a response to their review of his latest book: 
‘Block and Somers see in Polanyi a source of ideas to enrich social-democratic politics today. This requires 
constructing a coherent Polanyi. My project, in contrast, is Polanyiological and critical. It situates Polanyi 
historically, traces the evolution of his thought, and evaluates his oeuvre, with defenses of some theses and 
critiques—Marxist in spirit—of others.’28 One could argue that Dale shares Lacher’s critique of Block and 
Somers attempt to (abusively) understand Polanyian theory as an intellectual basis for new social-
democratic politics, while at the same time he concludes, in a way like Block and Somers, that Polanyi’s 
thought is not necessarily coherent and consistent as a whole. This is present in Dale’s evaluation of 
Polanyi’s critique of Marxist historical determinism.29  
A valuable addition to this can be found in the work of Christopher Holmes. He argues that the 
attempt to revitalize Polanyi’s ideas by trying to make an analysis through simply ‘copy-pasting’ these on 
current affairs is highly problematic. He states: ‘if a post- Polanyian approach is to be relevant, it must go 
beyond a critique of simple economism and instead address the complex and subtle constructions of 
governmental reason that have emerged since Polanyi’s time. There are already plenty of resources in 
Polanyi’s work that might provide the basis for doing just that, but, […] the greatest payoff will result from 
critical and innovative applications, rather than from recitation of Polanyi’s ideas in their original form.’30 
The apparent dichotomy in the discussion between hard- and soft-Polanyians suggests there is an 
intellectual struggle to find a final Polanyian position. However, Holmes points out this is a problematic 
quest, since it does not seriously take into account the weaknesses in Polanyi’s theory and the opportunities 
a shift of focus to this will provide.  
According to Holmes it is exactly from the weaker but original aspects of Polanyi’s analyses that a 
more contemporarily relevant point can be digested. This might sound contradictory, but it has to do with 
the previously indicated moral and ethical aspects of Polanyian theory. More precisely, it is about the 
relation of the economic vis-à-vis the social. Unlike many other important thinkers of the political-economic 
canon, Polanyi has put emphasis on the social over the economic. It is in this regard that his theory is often 
considered to be limited, since Polanyi has not engaged in the development of a distinctive economic theory. 
The social (which Polanyi values highly) is treated subordinately in most political-economic debates as a 
 
28 Gareth Dale, ‘Comment on Fred Block and Margaret R. Somers’s ‘‘Karl Polanyi in an Age of Uncertainty’’ 
(reviewing Gareth Dale’s Karl Polanyi: A Life on the Left) CS 46:4, 379–392, ’ Contemporary Sociology 46:6 
(2017), p.733.  
29 Gareth Dale, ‘Reconstructing Karl Polanyi: Excavation and Critique,’ (London: Pluto Press, 2016), p.33-54.   
30 Christopher Holmes, ‘Introduction: A post-Polanyian political economy for our times,’ Economy and Society 43:4 
(2014), p.538.  
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result of  a more formal and materialist focus. According to Holmes this can be attributed to the tremendous 
influence of Keynesian as well as Marxist theory in the political economic intellectual tradition. On human 
nature Polanyi concluded the following: ‘[man] does not act so as to safeguard his individual interest in the 
possession of material goods; he acts so as to safeguard his social standing, his social claims, his social 
assets. He values material goods only in so far as they serve this end.’31 In contrast, Keynes’ and Marx’ 
approaches tend to overlook the relevance of ideas and their social-cultural context in favor of a 
materialist/outcome-based  perspective: ‘for Keynes, the economy was nothing but a large machine which, 
if well managed, would serve only to churn out material satisfaction for members within it. Ideas were only 
relevant insofar as they enabled us to coax the economy to perform this task better. If they did this, then 
they were ‘right’ enough. For Marx, ideas were epiphenomenal to the real, material business of production 
– a product of our material economic conditions and interests, rather than a determinant of them.’32  
It is also in this light that one could perceive the split between the ‘financial’ and the ‘real’ 
economy, it suggests the former is less real than the latter and needs to be brought back in check. In the 
post-2008 timeframe this has become a strong rhetorical tool to attack the role and power of the financial 
industry sector in the context of the broader economy. In this frame the road to economic disaster was 
mostly determined by a wild-west type of finance that due to deregulatory measures lost out of sight its 
societal purpose and became a parasitical force. However, using this approach ultimately shuts down the 
opportunity to question and put under debate the general economic context and its social and societal 
implications. Just blaming finance for its fictionality without stretching this to a deeper analysis of the 
fictionality of the economic in a broader sense, is not intellectually consistent. Polanyi’s framework opens 
up a way to look at this matter in a perhaps more novel way. With the processes of commodification at the 
core of market society, can one truly speak of a split between the ‘fictional’ financial economy and a ‘real’ 
economy? The markets for and related to (the Polanyian fictitious commodities) land, labor and money are 
internalized in the real economy, as so much that they count as productivity in terms of GDP growth. Also 
the tax base is to a significant extent based and dependent on these aspects. It is the realization of this that 
reiterates the problematic nature of ‘regulated capitalism’ and in a way the soft-Polanyian understanding.   
A strong point of criticism on Polanyi’s perspective is the fact that Polanyi did not live up to his 
own beliefs regarding the lack of attention for the human and moral aspect within the economy. Polanyi 
reduced human economic behavior to be solely motivated by material gain. This is disappointing 
considering his conviction that economic behavior has to be situated within the context of social relations.33 
 
31 Polanyi, The Great Transformation, p.130.  
32 Holmes, ‘Introduction: A post-Polanyian political economy for our times,’ p.532. 
33 Viviana Zelizer, 'Beyond the polemics on the market: Establishing a theoretical and empirical agenda,' 
Sociological Forum 3:4 (1988), p.614-634. 
22 
 
  
 
Apparently, within capitalism Polanyi did not find space for what Holmes calls: ‘any sensitivity to the 
particular motives for particular types of market economic action at particular times and places, conditioned 
by particular social settings.’34 In the light of this observation one can identify the opportunities for the 
development for a so-called post-Polanyian perspective in order to fully revitalize some of Polanyi’s notions 
in contemporary debate. The strength in Polanyi’s theory lies in its reversal of the conventional materialism 
posed by Keynes and Marx. It allows for a vision to think through the purpose of the economy beyond the 
rigid parameters of economic performance and the working of the markets. For achieving an economy to 
be embedded in society, one needs to start with re-embedding the actual human understanding of what 
constitutes economy within society. To do this Polanyi provides a substantivist alternative to the 
conventional formal understanding of the ontology of economy. The latter is, as has been put forward 
already, market-based and focussed on utility maximalization, while the former perceives the economy as 
the institutionalization of human interaction and its natural surroundings.  
What Polanyi pointed at is the idea that the economy ultimately constitutes the way humans 
maintain their livelihood. In that regard perhaps the biggest peril of contemporary globalized capitalism is 
not the ongoing and infinite capital accumulation of the capitalist class in itself, but rather the significant 
and still increasing market dependency of people’s livelihood, a dependency that ultimately keeps the 
capitalist system in place. The dependency of so many people on the functioning of the market is for the 
capitalist classes the best defense against revolution. Taking into account the great attention Polanyi put 
forward to the social aspects of the economy, it is slightly surprising how little articulate Polanyi and the 
Polanyian intellectual tradition have been on the actual way of how to embed the economy within these 
social and societal relations, beyond the mere abolition of the commodification of land, labor and money. 
In current times a way to apply Polanyi in a more constructive contemporarily fitting manner would be of 
great value. In the post-GFC period there have been multiple attempts of policy making in order to re-
regulate the market. Some had more success than others, but one that still resonates in the quarters of power 
is the idea of a taxation on financial transactions. In the second part of the thesis this very idea of the FTT 
will be placed in the Polanyian context.  
 
34 Holmes, ‘Introduction: A post-Polanyian political economy for our times,’ p.531.  
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PART TWO 
A Polanyian Analysis of the Financial Transaction Tax 
in the Context of the European Union 
 
2.1 | The FTT in Theory: Tobin, Polanyi and the Formal vs. Substantivist Definition of Economy 
There have been many different proposals to regulate the market economy, but not many have gained the 
same traction as the taxation on financial transactions. In this regard, Polanyi has not been the only 
economic thinker that received renewed attention after the GFC, the work of American economist James 
Tobin was revisited, since he introduced the idea of a tax on financial transactions. Therefore, in many 
discussions on this tax it is often referred to as the Tobin tax. It is a small tax (something like 0.25%) that 
is imposed on all foreign exchange transactions, hereby countermanding the speculative whims of 
international finance and taking a step in preventing what Costas Lapavitsas has dubbed ‘profiting without 
producing.’35 The call for a Tobin tax is sometimes referred to as a clear-cut example of a Polanyian counter 
movement. Helleiner argues that it is one of the most feasible policy options of regulating international 
capitalism by cutting out speculative (bad) investment saying ‘it represents the most prominent initiative 
today to restore the kind of Polanyian vision that had been present at Bretton Woods.’36 Due to the low rate 
of the tax multinational companies will not be hurt by it, but it will discourage speculative ‘by the wind’ 
investments. Furthermore, it is not only a way to curb short-term speculative trading, it can also generate 
revenue for the government.  
Helleiner points out that already since the start of the neoliberal ‘revolution’ in the 1970s and 80s 
a countermovement has emerged. Not from the usual ‘leftist’ oriented movements, but rather from an 
institutional-elitist front: the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel. Within the BIS many of the 
central banks of the industrialized world coordinate monetary policy and banking regulation(s) at an 
international or practically even global level. The Tobin tax was embraced by the central banks that are 
member of the BIS as a measure to stabilize the international economic system.37 The global institutional 
architecture already in place through BIS could in turn provide the institutional and political framework to 
engage in more ways of intervention in the global financial order, such as the imposition of certain forms 
of taxation like the Tobin tax. In addition, currently the tax is supported by 65% of the European population, 
the European Commission has put it forward as a policy proposal (which will be discussed in subchapter 
2.3) and also several major neoclassical economists such as Joseph Stiglitz and Paul Krugman are 
advocating for its implementation. As becomes clear the FTT is an idea already more than fifty years old 
 
35 Costas Lapavitsas, Profiting without Producing: How Finance Exploits Us All, (London: Verso Books, 2013). 
36 Helleiner, ‘Globalization and Haute Finance,’ p.18. 
37 Ibid., p.19.  
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and has been proposed and embraced by a number of different societal segments and elites. Helleiner’s 
understanding of the FTT fits in the Polanyian perspective of Block and Somers: it constitutes a way of 
getting the market in check. As pointed out in subchapter 1.3 this also assumes there exists a difference 
between a so-called ‘fictional’ financial economy and a ‘real’ economy. Taxing finance in order to make it 
more effective and in line with the real economy builds on this assumption. In this light, it is important to 
point out another insight in Polanyian’s theory, already briefly touched upon earlier: the idea of a formal 
and substantivist understanding of what constitutes the economy, simply said: the difference between the 
economy as a means of capital accumulation and increasing self-again and as a way to provide and maintain 
a livelihood for humankind. 
Referring to this, Polanyi provided a different approach to the functioning of capitalism than other 
thinkers in the canon of economic thought. Polanyian thought shows the pivotal role of market dependency 
in capitalism. Meant with this is the increasing dependency of people on the market to provide for their 
livelihood. This is  what Polanyi’s moral approach is about, in the sense that it alters the view many critics 
of capitalism carry around. Capitalism does not primarily work on the basis of capital accumulation, even 
to the contrary, that dynamic in effect is only the result of an traditionally overlooked prime dynamic of 
capitalism: the ever increasing market dependency. This dependency is widespread and ultimately works 
through the classes. Naturally, the lowest income groups are the most vulnerable in their dependency, but 
in principle the capitalist class is just as dependent on the workings of the market as anybody else. In this 
light it might be easier to understand why intervention in and regulation of the market is more problematic 
than advocates for social-democracy and regulated capitalism seem to realize. The market dependency is 
the main barrier to potential regulatory success, since any state intervention to cushion the effects of the 
forces of the markets, poses in itself a distortion of the underlying logic of the market, i.e. calculations and 
formulas such as the law of demand and supply that are inherent to the market principle. Even though one 
could argue the market itself is a construct and therefor fictitious, having embraced the market principle 
through the imposition and institutionalization of capitalism, it has become a ‘real thing’ in its life defining 
power(s). Capitalism has become the global political economy’s morality and its modus operandi.  
The economist-materialist dimension is not what precedes human thinking and ideation. One could 
argue it is rather the other way around: the former is actually successive to human’s ideas and beliefs about 
markets and its underlying morality. In this way, also the attempts for (re)regulation of finance and the 
economy after the GFC can be perceived. The period of crisis gave urgency to come up with proposals to 
save and subsequently safeguard the economy. The crisis was deep and overwhelming and the economic 
materialist state of affairs was an absolute pandemonium at the time. This gave reason to politicians, 
officials and regulators to be tough on the industry responsible for the havoc and precarious situation. 
Nevertheless, ultimately the attempts remain hollow, short-lived and at the very least insufficient. Why 
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would this be the case and what causes the belief that keeps the market to remain at the very centre of our 
economy?   
Holmes points out that this has to do with the notion of rationalization i.e. ‘the subsumption of the 
autonomous individual and community within abstract, universalizing modes of thought.’38 It is about the 
way and the extent to which people deal with and adapt to the external logic and forces, such as the market, 
entering their lives, in order to ensure their livelihood. One could argue this is what society under capitalism 
has been doing at all different levels: a gradual acceptance and embracement of the market as its central 
mode of organization to the extent that to think beyond the market is out of the question. In his work, 
Polanyi wanted to pay attention to the contextual over the universal, in the sense that it provides an 
opportunity to respect the ‘variety of springs of human motivation’ beyond its economistic-materialism. 
This approach enables a novel type of Polanyian or perhaps post-Polanyian scholarship that delves into the 
deeper morality of market related legislative development.  
Taxation is an interesting field of interest in this regard, since it is an indispensable aspect of the 
political economy, even the fiercest libertarian will understand there is a need for at least some taxation in 
order to manage the organization of society. This allows for a variety of different perceptions and insights.  
 
2.2 | The FTT Contested: Evidence from the Financial Markets 
While the FTT has been theorized in many ways, it is valuable to see to what extent the FTT has actually 
been implemented and assess whether this has been successful. More specifically it might be worthwhile 
to evaluate what have been the effects on financial as well as real economic indicators. An established effect 
of FTT’s is that they ‘tend to have negative effects on trading volume, liquidity, and some measures of 
market efficiency.’39 However, according to two studies by Riordan et al40 and Hendershott and Riordan41 
respectively in 2011 and 2012 it is impossible to make any other general conclusions on the basis of 
outcomes from previous cases of an imposition of a FTT. In a study of the market effects of a unilaterally 
imposed FTT in France, measurement shows that the market quality decreased and this poses the risk of a 
rise in the cost of capital, which could ultimately hurt the real economy. Aiming at the political reasoning 
behind the FTT in France Meyer et al put it like this: ‘the taxation of financial transactions is only one 
possibility to share the burdens of the financial crisis, which is one of the major political aims beyond the 
 
38 Holmes, Introduction: A post-Polanyian political economy for our times, p.533. 
39 Stephan Meyer, Martin Wagener and Christof Weinhardt, ‘Politically Motivated Taxes in Financial Markets: The 
Case of the French Financial Transaction Tax,’ Journal of Financial Services Research 47 (2015), p.178.  
40 Ryan Riordan, Andreas Storkenmaier and Martin Wagener, ‘Do multilateral trading facilities contribute to market 
quality?’ Social Science Research Network Working Paper (2011).    
41 Terrence Hendershott and Ryan Riordan, ‘Algorithmic trading and the market for liquidity,’ Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis 48:4 (2012).  
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introduction of the tax in France. Policy makers should be well aware that a financial transaction tax will 
increase transaction costs for all types of investors alike.’42 Meyer et al show in their econometric analysis 
what the effects of the FTT’s introduction in France were on the trading numbers and volumes.  
Figure 1: Differences in trading volume in millions of Euros. The gaps in the lines mark the day of the FTT’s 
introduction in France: August 1, 2012.43 
 
The graph provided shows a decrease of 17.6 % on the Euronext Paris and 26.1 % on the Chi-X in trade 
volume after the introduction of the financial transaction tax in August 2012.  
 
42 Meyer et al, ‘Politically Motivated Taxes in Financial Markets: The Case of the French Financial Transaction 
Tax,’, p.201. 
43 Ibid., p.191.  
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Figure 2: Differences in number of trades in millions of Euros. The gaps in the lines mark the day of the FTT’s 
introduction in France: August 1, 2012.44 
 
The second graph, which indicates the difference in the number of trades after the introduction of the tax in 
August 2012, shows a decrease of 19.2 % on the Euronext Paris and 14.0 % on the Chi-X. These decreases 
are to be explained by investors that moved away from these markets, due to the increased cost of the tax.  
Meyer et al criticize the fact that, depending on the design of the tax, retail investors will also pay 
the full tax rate, for example on their transactions for retirement saving plans.’45 Put simply: a FTT 
eventually will also hit the ordinary people. This is an often heard argument from the side of the financial 
markets, also articulated in the current American debate on Sander’s Wall Street Tax (in that context it will 
hurt Main Street instead of Wall Street).46 In 2011, in the midst of the revived global discussion (epitomized 
by the G20 summit in France) on the FTT, the IMF published a working paper in which it concludes that 
its imposition has an adverse effect on the working of financial markets. In the end, the issuers of financial 
products will pass the extra cost of the tax on to investors and as Matheson argues: the burden of the FTT 
eventually ‘will fall more heavily on labor than on capital owners as the elasticity of the supply of capital 
 
44 Ibid. 
45 Meyer et al, ‘Politically Motivated Taxes in Financial Markets,’ p.201.  
46 Modern Markets Initiative, ‘The Financial Transaction Tax is a Retirement Tax: Responses From Critics,’ 
accessed on 14 December, 2019, https://www.modernmarketsinitiative.org/ftt.  
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increases.’47 In contrast, in a paper on the societal effects of a FTT Berentsen et al provide evidence for the 
positive effect the imposition of a FTT can have on overall welfare, simply meaning the amount of money 
used for consumption flowing from the financial markets.48  
 Ultimately, scholarship on the matter is relatively divided about the idea’s potential. The tax can 
have a variety of consequences, some of which are not in line with what its introducers promise it will do, 
which makes the economic-scientific basis for the tax proposal diffuse.   
 
2.3 | The FTT under Debate: Polanyi and the Case of the European Union 
As has been established before, soft-Polanyians like Block and Somers tend to argue Polanyian thought is 
a call for a return to the social-democratic ideal. Social-democracy is a political ideology and political-
economic configuration that is assumed to be on the retreat in the current times of neoliberal domination in 
Europe. Nevertheless, a FTT fits into the social-democratic ideal and has seen a surge in popularity among 
nations again. Having established a critique on this perhaps naïve approach to the possibilities of regulating 
capitalism and after putting forward the theoretical and technical elaborations on the FTT, it is now time to 
make an attempt linking the Polanyian discussion to the real-time debate of the FTT in the EU. First, the 
debate on the development and implementation of a FTT in the EU will be contextualized and exposed in 
a clear manner. Subsequently, a few Polanyian insights will be mirrored against the debate on the FTT as 
it has played itself out to this date. In this regard, two important aspects of the previously laid-out Polanyian 
perspectives will be systemically brought into the analysis. At first, the question on the impossibility of 
regulating capitalism will be posed, taking into account the different stakeholders, their interests and 
articulations. This will be followed and complemented by taking into the analysis the ideas put forward in 
subchapter 1.3, regarding Polanyi’s moral and ethical understanding of the economy. Through this approach 
the practical complexity of the FTT at an EU level can be better understood. 
In the EU the idea for the introduction of a FTT came into popularity again during the aftermath of 
the financial crash of 2008 in its subsequent sovereign debt crisis in the EU, better known as the Eurocrisis. 
In order to shift a part of the financial burden of resolving the crisis, some European governments and EU 
officials wanted to impose a FTT. Currently the FTT is still under debate in the EU as an official policy 
proposal and it has already been in the legislative pipeline since at least 2011. The debate sparked great 
controversy among EU member states with two opposing groups. Eleven countries, including France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain were in favor of the implementation of a FTT in the EU and fifteen were strongly 
 
47 Thornton Matheson, ‘Taxing Financial Transactions: Issues and Evidence,’ IMF Working Paper 11:54 (2011), 
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48Aleksander Berentsen, Samuel Huber and Alessandro Marchesiani, ‘The societal benefit of a financial transaction 
tax,’ European Economic Review 89 (2016).   
29 
 
  
 
arguing against it, most fiercely the United Kingdom. Its finance minister George Osborne described the 
proposal during a European Council meeting as follows: ‘if we could agree a financial transaction tax 
globally, that would be a good thing, but that is not going to happen.’49 This is even more exemplified by 
Osborne’s Prime Minister David Cameron calling the proposal ‘quite simply madness’ during the 2012 
World Economic Forum, arguing it would seriously hamper the EU’s economic performance.50 These are 
some of the main arguments put forward by antagonists of the FTT. The stand-off between countries on 
this topic is significant. For this reason the European Council has decided in 2013 to move forward on the 
matter by means of ‘enhanced cooperation’, which is a way to continue the legislative procedure with a 
smaller group of benevolent countries, alternatively called a ‘coalition of the willing.’ In 2013, the 
following eleven member states were part of the ‘enhanced cooperation’ route towards a common FTT: 
Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. 
Estonia officially dropped-out of the procedure in 2016 and the current Austrian government is known to 
be extremely critical of the proposal. It shows the idea is partly contingent on member states continuation 
of government, since a political change within member states can have consequences on countries’ positions 
vis-à-vis topics like these.   
In the European Commission’s original proposal a comprehensive explanation is provided: ‘the  
recent  global  economic  and  financial  crisis  had  a  serious  impact  on  our  economies  and  the  public 
finances. The financial sector has played a major role in causing the economic crisis whilst governments 
and European citizens at large have borne the cost. There is a strong consensus within Europe and 
internationally that the financial sector should contribute more fairly given the costs of dealing with the 
crisis and the current under-taxation of the sector. Several EU Member States have already taken divergent 
action in the area of financial sector taxation.’51 The FTT’s proposal is configurated in the following way: 
it will impose a minimum tax rate of 0.1% on all financial transactions, except the trade of derivates which 
will be subject to a rate of at least 0.01%. Three main objectives underpin the proposal: harmonization of 
(indirect) financial transaction tax throughout the EU, establishment of a fair contribution by the financial 
sector hereby creating a level playing field of taxation vis-à-vis other sectors, and the creation of appropriate 
disincentives for inefficient market transactions to add to the regulatory measures to make the financial 
 
49 George Osborne in the European Council (November 8, 2011), ‘On the European Commission’s proposed 
introduction of a Financial Transaction Tax,’ accessed on July 2, 2020, 
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proposed introduction of a Financial Transaction Tax as ‘madness,’ accessed on July 2, 2020, 
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sector more resilient against crises. For a more detailed outline of the FTT’s range and application see the 
following figure by Grahl and Lysandrou: 
 
Rate of FTT 0.1% for securities 
0.01% for derivates 
Range of financial 
instruments subject to 
FTT 
Range covers all instruments which are negotiable on the capital market, 
money market instruments including repurchase agreements (repos),units or 
shares in collective investment undertakings (including undertakings for 
collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and alternative 
investment funds) and derivatives contracts. 
Range of financial 
institutions subject to 
FTT 
Range includes investment firms, organized markets, credit institutions, 
insurance and reinsurance undertakings, collective investment undertakings 
and their managers, pension funds and their managers, holding companies, 
financial leasing companies and special purpose entities. 
Residence principle  The FTT applies if one of the parties to a transaction is a financial institution 
that is established in a Member State, where ‘established’ means that the 
financial institution has its registered seat, its permanent address, its usual 
residence or a branch in that Member State. 
Figure 3: The European Commission’s Proposed FTT Outlined52 
The proposal is currently still under debate at the tax related meetings of the ECOFIN configuration 
of the Council of the European Union. Last meeting, during which the FTT has been discussed, took place 
on June 5, 2020. To sketch the state of affairs on the topic, the summary comes down to this: ‘to be noted, 
a large number of important considerations have to be taken into account in the discussions among the 
participating Member States, before any consensus is presented to all Member States for an inclusive 
discussion. It has already been clarified (also at ECOFIN level in June 2019) that should an informal 
agreement among Member States participating in the enhanced co-operation be reached, it would only be 
a preliminary step in the legislative process. If, at some point, a draft text of a Directive is tabled by the 
participating Member States, any decision (formal agreement) in the Council should be preceded by an 
inclusive and substantial debate among all Member States.’53 The historical outline and political state of 
affairs provided above shows how hard it is to actually reach an agreement on legislation on this matter. 
Generally, European tax proposals have a hard time in reaching the actual stage of implementation, but in 
the case of the FTT it is almost miraculous that after more than nine years of negotiation this proposal is 
still even on the table.  
 
52 John Grahl and Photis Lysandrou, ‘The European Commission’s Proposal for a Financial Transactions Tax: A 
Critical Assessment,’ Journal of Common Market Studies 52:2 (2014), p.236.  
53 Council of the European Union, ‘ECOFIN Report to the European Council on tax issues,’ FISC 120: ECOFIN 
450 (2020), p.22.  
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In traditional Marxist theory, looking at different interest groups in capitalist political economy, a 
split is made between capital and labor. Wolfgang Streeck has introduced a comparable dichotomy by the 
name of the so-called Staatsvolk and Marktvolk. The first represents the broader societal interest and the 
latter the demands of neoliberal capitalism.54 At first sight, this framework provides an useful approach to 
look at colliding interests and the nature of policy making in the EU. However, it needs some scrutiny, 
which can be provided through the insights of Holmes, described in subchapter 1.3. Using the traditional 
approach of capitalism being solely based on increasing capital accumulation it is right to identify a pro-
market force on the one hand (Marktvolk) and a regulatory force on the other (Staatsvolk). Stripped to its 
core, the former wishes to configurate the political economy to its needs, in order to maximize capital 
accumulation, the latter wants to keep this development in check, to take into account the broader interest 
of its constituents and citizens. In the case of the FTT there was and is a political will among a range of 
different counties and EU institutions to strive for its imposition. This could be perceived as a Polanyian 
countermovement responding to the havoc of the GFC caused by neoliberal capitalism and, as such, an 
attempt to (re)embed the market. In this regard, it represents the idea of a double movement, with the 
Marktvolk pushing for deregulation and pro-market policies and the countermovement of the Staatsvolk 
attempting to re-regulate. The former group in this regard heavily scrutinizes the idea of a FTT by putting 
forward lots of empirical evidence, showing that it will not be effective and will rather harm the real 
economy, subsequently backfiring societally, mostly at the expense of the working classes. The second 
group probably identifies with Block and Somers, in the goal of reaching embeddedness just like has been 
done in the post-war period: the golden age of social-democracy. The first fits in the more ‘fatalist’ approach 
of hard-Polanyialism by Lacher, in the sense that their criticism of the FTT proofs the hard-Polanyian point 
of the impossibility of (re)embedding the market (within the capitalist system). Invoking Holmes’ 
perspective on Polanyi, does one realize there is value in moving beyond this dual perspective.  
This brings one back to the case of the FTT. As the theoretical explanation above makes clear it 
would be too facile to engage in an analysis through a pure capitalist exploitative argument. Hereby in its 
own way falling into the trap of the economic fallacy, arguing every mode of economic behavior is 
economistic-materialist by nature, i.e. every decision is made for self-gain and the accumulation of capital. 
In this regard, there is a need to identify the different stakeholders in the debate on the FTT as well as their 
main arguments for or against its introduction. As has been said: currently there are ten participating 
member states in the enhanced cooperation on the EU’s FTT including the big economies Germany, France, 
Italy and Spain. The biggest opponents of an European FTT are currently countries like Sweden, Denmark, 
the Netherlands, the Czech Republic and before Brexit the United Kingdom. These are countries that are 
 
54 Wolfgang Streeck, ‘Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism,’ (London: Verso Books, 2014), 
p.93.  
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known to be sceptic about financial and fiscal integration, traditionally pointing at national sovereignty and 
responsibility in this regard. The biggest concern the opposing member states have against the imposition 
of the FTT is its limited scope. At most it would have to be implemented in all 27 member states and the 
biggest fear is the FTT will negatively affect the European block’s competitiveness vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world. Sweden has experience with this: between 1984 and 1991 they had installed a FTT and this caused 
an outflow of companies of the financial service industry from the country.  
The British were against an EU FTT since it would have a significant impact on the British and the 
world’s largest financial centre: the City of London. Most of the financial flows in the EU go through the 
City and it would mean the UK would de facto become the EU’s biggest collector of the FTT. The British 
fear it would have an adverse effect on its countries broader economic performance and even filed a 
complaint against the European Commission’s proposal at the European Court of Justice, arguing the 
proposal is incompatible with the EU’s internal market and therefor can not be implemented by enhanced 
cooperation due to its extraterritorial effects.55 According to the opposing parties in the discussion on the 
FTT, the proposal is especially harmful for small investors and middle and lower income groups, while the 
member states arguing in favor of the proposal stress the opportunity it poses to collect funds for the EU 
budget and the moral motivation of justice. Justice in this case means providing a level playing field vis-à-
vis other (transnational) industries as well as with regard to the European citizenry, who have been 
pressured hard to pick up the tap to finance the saving of the Eurozone. This is where the Polanyian 
distinction between the formal and substantivist meaning of economy becomes useful. Arguments against 
the FTT seem to be most primarily based on the formal meaning, in the way they are a backed-up with an 
economistic-materialist rationale, pointing at the broader economic effects of the introduction of the FTT, 
which basically means a drop in GDP growth, a rise of unemployment, perhaps followed by an increase of 
inflation, depending on the monetary and fiscal response. The advocates for the FTT can be perceived to 
be (soft-)Polanyian and substantivist in the way the argument is built around the moral argument of striving 
for justice and equity for all segments of the EU’s political economy. 
A different insight is provided by Dale who has reviewed different perspectives on Polanyi’s 
possible attitude with regard to the European integration project. Polanyi himself has not given much 
attention to the integrational development in post-war Western-Europe, but still there is space for Polanyian 
analysis, which some scholars have attempted to do accordingly. Copeland argues e.g. that social policies 
of harmonization put forward as part of the EU’s ‘social dimension’ (which was included in the Treaty of 
 
55 Federico Fabbrini, 'Economic Governance in Europe: Comparative Paradoxes and Constitutional Challenges,' 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p.170-171. 
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Maastricht) represent a Polanyian counter-movement.56 In addition, Caporaso and Tarrow advocate that 
after a period of focus on marketization and liberalization in the European economy, the EU entered a 
period in which it is socially (re)embedding the market.57 However, Alexander Ebner argues it is actually 
on the contrary: it is not ‘about the promotion of social embeddedness, but rather about market order.’58 
Similarly the introduction of the FTT can be perceived. In this way the FTT is a way to harmonize and 
further integrate the European market. The idea in this sense is that the FTT will be implemented by some 
(more radical) member states anyway, looking at France who has already introduced it unilaterally. By 
demanding the introduction of the FTT by at least a group of countries through enhanced cooperation, it is 
a way to prevent market distortion through differing tax rates and schemes throughout the EU. Also the 
objective of making overall investment more effective holds a special interest, since the proposal is mostly 
concerned with the speculative aspect of trading, such as the business of flash trading. This because the 
latter poses a threat to the performance of traditional investors (pension funds, investment banks, insurance 
companies etc.) which are basically the bearers of the financial-economic system as we know it. According 
to the proponents of the FTT it is in the public interest of the EU to impose the taxation, since it will broaden 
the EU wide tax base and, thus, provides opportunities to raise the EU budget.  
In the macro-economics impact assessment made on request of the European Commission in 2013 
the FTT will most likely result in a slight decrease of GDP growth. In the impact assessment different ways 
of coping with the tax imposition are discussed, since the overall effect of the tax will depend on possible 
accompanying measures. In principle, just looking at the basic impact of the tax the impact assessment 
shows that the introduction of the tax will negatively affect the EU’s GDP growth rate. Fast forwarding to 
2050 it would mean the EU’s GDP would be 0.3% lower (81.1% higher than in 2013) compared to a 
scenario in which the tax would not have been imposed (81.4% higher than in 2013). This could be made 
up for by using the raised tax revenues for new growth stimulating investment or by lowering the income 
or corporate taxes to rebate the ‘FTT revenues [which] would lead to a more favourable picture  for overall 
economic efficiency and, thus, economic growth.’59 As has been pointed out before, the tax collecting 
potential of the FTT is significant, especially taking into account the rise in financial transaction volume 
over the last decades. The Financial Times has published extensively on the topic and pointed out an 
important aspect: how does one define the differences between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ financial market activity 
 
56 Paul Copeland, International Political Economy and European Integration: Applying Karl Polanyi’s The Great 
Transformation, IPEG Papers in Global Political Economy (2009), p.40.  
57 James Caporaso and Sidney Tarrow, ‘Polanyi in Brussels: Supranational Institutions and the Transnational 
Embedding of Markets,’ International Organization 63:4, p.599.   
58 Alexander Ebner, ‘The Intellectual Foundations of the Social Market Economy: Theory, Policy and Implications 
for European Integration,’ Journal of Economic Studies 33:3 (2006), p.216.  
59 European Commission, Impact Assessment of COM(2013) 71, Staff Working Document 28 (2013), p.45. 
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in terms of societal interest? Derivates are a good example in this regard, since they have been equally used 
for the practice of ‘hedging’ (having an investment position to offset potential losses in other investments) 
as well as speculation. Also pension funds (this is why The Netherlands is known to be dismissive of the 
FTT) and the repo (repurchase) market (which is used for (re)financing of debt and the provision of every-
day liquidity, also significantly by governments) will be affected by the tax.60 From a Polanyian perspective 
the problem with this kind of discussion could be its limited democratic nature and ‘elitism’.  
Certainly, there have been polls conducted amongst the European people to take stock of its attitude 
regard the imposition of a FTT and (as has been pointed at earlier) a majority of 65% was in favor, when 
asked about their opinion in 2011.61 However, the most important feature of Polanyi’s political theory is 
the notion of democratic control over economic processes. In a debate like this the demos only gets involved 
rather indirectly through their mandated governments negotiating in the EU. In a way political discussion 
itself has been disembedded. This could partly be the explanation for why the FTT is such a contentious 
proposal since it is ultimately unclear what its real implications will be for the livelihood of every different 
European citizen. Clearly, the potential negative effect on GDP growth and the investment position of 
pension funds or the higher cost of refinancing government debt are good indicators, but ultimately these 
need to be translated to the citizen’s level. Referring to the notion of closing a fairness gap is one thing, but 
would it in this regard not be ‘fair’ to give the European demos a stronger voice in determining the nature 
of the gap’s closure? This is an important Polanyian insight and would ultimately require a different 
relationship between capital and democracy. More practically, as Dale points out, invoking the work of Pat 
Devine: ‘Ownership of productive enterprise would be social, with ownership bodies comprising 
‘stakeholders’ – representatives of groups affected by the use of the assets involved. Economic decision-
making would be democratic, with bodies of stakeholders negotiating the major decisions regarding what 
to produce, where to target investment and how to allocate society’s resources. The system’s benefits would 
include the expansion of democracy and the transcendence of narrow self-interest, the reduction of 
inequality, and the promotion of efficiency in regard to the fulfilment of human needs.’62  
In this light, Caporaso and Tarrow  argued in 2010 that the EU’s institutional elites have become 
aware of the concerns that have popped up from society and have therefor shifted from a market friendly 
approach towards a more socially concerned perspective, describing current European integration to be 
Polanyian in nature, because especially the European Court of Justice (ECJ) plays an decisive role in ruling 
against discriminatory measures by member states. However, in a response to this, Höpner and Schäfer 
 
60 Financial Times, Financial Transaction Tax, accessed on June 30, 2020, https://www.ft.com/indepth/financial-
transaction-tax. 
61 Eurobarometer, ‘Public Opinion in the European Union on the Financial Transaction Tax in 2011,’ accessed on 
July 2, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/eb/eb75/eb75_en.pdf. 
62 Gareth Dale,’ Karl Polanyi: The Limits of the Market,’ (London: Polity Press, 2010), p.211. 
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convincingly show these measures practically have a market-enforcing dynamic rather than being market-
restrictive or socially protective. This due to the heterogeneity between the significantly member-state 
based welfare and social protection programs. In other words, the social policy dimension in the EU is 
fragmentized over member states and does therefor not really exist at a supranational level. On the other 
hand, market-based policies are very much implemented and ruled over from a supranational setting, due 
to the historically market-focused nature of the EU. This results in instances where the ECJ reprimands 
member states that try to implement socially protective measures for unrightfully interfering with the four 
freedoms of the EU’s common market.63 According to Höpner and Schäfer ‘only those EU initiatives that 
cause conflict have politicization potential. They cross the threshold of public attention and spark public 
debates, even protests. Yet the politicization they cause does not necessarily lead to a greater sensibility for 
the arguments of the opposing side; instead, it often breeds skepticism on the part of those who fear 
becoming the losers of further market integration. The result could be both a growing distance from Europe 
and the call for protectionism. We argue that such counterreactions, rather than recent ECJ case law,  have 
“Polanyian” content.’64 Similarly, the EU’s FTT should be perceived. Currently, it has not been instigated 
by a strong societal based counter-movement, but rather from the EU’s institutional level itself, most 
significantly for its potential for market harmonization. By imposing a FTT at an EU wide level, the 
opportunities for member states that want to more radically address the ills of the financial sector tend be 
slimmer. As the United Kingdom’s Independence Party MEP Godfrey Bloom commented in the European 
Parliament eight years ago:  
‘All taxes are passed on to customers at the end of the day. Sorry everybody, that is just 
how it works. So again it will be the little people that pick up the tab. It will be savers, it 
will be pensioners and ordinary folk that will pick up this tax, not the greedy fat-cat bankers 
that you are trying to get at. And is it not interesting if you look into the small print, they 
are saying some of the money raised can actually go towards, perhaps, saving future failed 
banks? So we know, we concede, that more banks are going to fail. We know this because 
we have the same ridiculous fractional reserve banking system, the same crooked money 
printing criminal behavior at the central banks […] so nothing has changed,  another strong 
signal to bankers and politicians to continue the theft.’65 
 
63 Martin Höpner and Armin Schäfer, Polanyi in Brussels? Embeddedness and the Three Dimensions of European 
Economic Integration, Max Planck Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Discussion Paper 10:8 (2010), p.14-21.  
64 Höpner and Schäfer, Polanyi in Brussels?, p.27-28.  
65 UKIP’s MEP Godfrey Bloom at the European Parliament (23 May, 2012), ‘On the Financial Transaction Tax,’ 
accessed on July 1, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HAB65t4Xh-c. 
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This quote, although articulated slightly hefty, sums up in a simple way what the FTT ultimately is about. 
It constitutes an extra instrument to further deepen and harmonize the EU’s common and internal market. 
In this light, it is neither a serious attempt to re-embed the market nor a true Polanyian counter-movement, 
since the inherently disembedding tendencies of the market economy are not addressed: the ongoing 
commodification of the ‘fictitious commodities’ labor, land and money and the subsequently rapid 
increasing market-dependency of the European people.  
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Conclusion 
Polanyian thought remains to be an useful perspective for the study of society, capitalism and the market 
economy. Especially in contemporary times where there is an ongoing tension between state and market, 
the notions of embeddedness, commodification and the double movement prove to be valuable tools to 
understand the perils of this time. The aftermath of the GFC of 2008 and the current COVID-19 pandemic 
have shown the vulnerabilities of our political economies, but the response of governments and civil society 
simultaneously showed the resilience and agency still left to actively engage in political debates on whether 
and how the political economy should be reconfigured. This offers hope for the future. Nonetheless, what 
the topic and discussion of this thesis have been indicating is that the conditions under (and extent to) which 
the current capitalist system is prone to fundamental reform are important to take into account. For this 
reason invoking Polanyian theory is a sensible move, because it allows to look at the characteristics of the 
capitalist market economy at a more fundamental and moral level, in order to understand what is at stake 
in discussions like this. Ultimately, as Clark and Holmes have argued convincingly it is human livelihood 
itself what has been transformed by capitalism and its market mechanism. Therefore, in the debate between 
the soft- and hard-Polanyians it is important to invoke Polanyi in the ‘right’ way.  
What has been tried to point out in this thesis is the pivotal role performed by the commodification 
of the so-called ‘fictitious commodities’ in making the capitalist market economy. This dynamic is crucial 
in making practically every aspect of society market-dependent, including most primarily people’s 
livelihood. It is for this reason that the soft-Polanyian approach ultimately lacks to be convincing, since it 
does not look beyond the ‘facade’ of market regulation. Polanyi might not have been the clearest of all 
theorists, but he was clear about one thing: embedding the economy in the Polanyian sense can only happen 
when the market is not the primal driver of social and societal relations. It is this moral and substantivist 
approach to the economy that has been tried to bring forward in this thesis.  
 In the case of the proposal of a FTT in the EU the following conclusions can be made. First of all 
there are a few practical difficulties popping up with the FTT. There is the issue of collecting the tax. Before 
Brexit and the enhanced cooperation approach it was clear that the biggest place of collection would be the 
City of London. That will not happen in the current stage, since the UK has left the EU. In addition, tax 
collection is a national competence and there exists a lot of heterogeneity between the institutional 
arrangements for doing so. This is one of the points of divergence Höpner and Schäfer talked about that 
stands in the way of harmonized socially protective policy making. In addition, as the impact assessment 
of the European Commission shows, the success (in terms of its broader economic objectives) of the tax 
depends on its accompanying measures in terms of the subsequent nature of investment and tax reform. 
This raises questions such as whether the wish to simultaneously increase tax rates and GDP growth is 
economically realistic or that it is time to abandon the GDP growth obsession all together and embrace the 
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radical notion of de-growth? The latter is getting increasingly more traction in academic and activist circles 
and has been described by some scholars as a clear-cut example of a Polanyian counter-movement.66 De-
growth is considered to be so, since it is virtually the only approach to the current crisis of global climate 
change that addresses its root cause: the excessive exploitation of the earth’s resources catalyzed by the 
commodification of land, labor and money. In this light the sketched dichotomy between ‘speculative’ and 
‘productive’ finance is problematic, because in a capitalist market economy with high rates of 
commodification and financialization the split is rather blurred. Look for example at the way pension funds 
are configurated vis-à-vis the state, the market and its beneficiaries. In that case, the very principle of 
livelihood is dependent on the profitability of the financial markets. Taking Polanyi seriously in these 
regards would mean a fundamental transformation towards a system in which democratic oversight and 
decision making power will determine economic governance. Thereby, giving the workers back their say 
over the direction their (national) economy is heading. The main question in that regard is whether this is 
actually possible under the auspices of the EU, due to its inherently ordoliberal and market-fundamentalist 
nature.  
 Zooming out at a meta level, one wonders whether capitalism is to be reformed or regulated at all? 
This question echoes all recent election debates dealing with the workings of the (global) economy. In the 
U.S. prominent Democratic Party candidates, taking part in the presidential primaries earlier this year, like 
Bernie Sanders67 and Elizabeth Warren68 took a lot of time and effort trying to point the finger to the ills of 
the market economy, tabling a variety of regulatory measures, amongst which the introduction of a FTT. It 
should not come as a surprise that soft-Polanyians like Block and Somers consider Sanders and Warren to 
be proponents of the social-democratic ideal of regulated capitalism and therefor part of a Polanyian 
countermovement. 69 The contemporary political momentum in the U.S. and the EU truly shows Polanyi’s 
relevance and with regard to this the discussion on the different understandings of what the different 
Polanyian notions fundamentally mean is essential. In this thesis, an attempt has been made on shedding 
light on this debate. This by outlining the distinction between soft-Polanyians and hard-Polanyians and 
arguing for a possible shift to a discussion beyond this dichotomy, in the post-Polanyian spirit of what 
 
66 Diana Stuart, Ryan Gunderson and Brian Peterson, ‘Climate Change and the Polanyian Counter-movement: 
Carbon Markets or Degrowth?’ New Political Economy 24:1 (2019).  
67 Bloomberg, ‘Bernie Sanders Proposes Taxing Wall Street to Pay Student Debts’, accessed on July 2, 2020, 
’https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-24/sanders-to-propose-taxing-wall-street-to-pay-off-student-
debts. 
68 Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy, ‘Sen. Warren Proposes Sweeping Tax Changes to Finance Medicare 
for All,’ accessed on July 2, 2020, https://itep.org/sen-warren-proposes-sweeping-tax-changes-to-finance-medicare-
for-all/.  
69 Fred Block and Margaret Somers, ‘Karl Polanyi in an Age of Uncertainty,’ Contemporary Sociology 46:6 (2017), 
p.380.  
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Holmes is arguing for, especially by focusing on the moral and ethical dimension of Polanyi’s analysis. The 
variety of crises the world is currently facing, represents a paramount challenge. Even though these crises 
can be superficially perceived as only remotely interlinked, after closer examination there is an omnipresent 
common denominator: the widespread system of globalized capitalism. Climate change, the COVID-19 
pandemic, excessive social and economic inequality, poverty, environmental disasters, institutional racism. 
In the end, they all find their origins in an unjust and failing economic system. Revisiting the intellectual 
ideas of a scholar like Karl Polanyi helps in the development of a stronger understanding of how the system 
works, how we ended up here and, possibly, how we can get away from it.  
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